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Non-Technical Summary
The picture of the securities exchanges and financial sectors in CEE countries is still
relatively unfavorable. The CEE securities exchanges – with the only exception of
the Warsaw Stock Exchange – are, in comparison with their western counterparts,
underdeveloped and less important for the domestic economies in general and for
corporate finance in particular. Markets for derivatives exist only in Poland and
Hungary. The trade in derivatives is particularly active in Poland which emphasizes
the leading role of the Polish stock market in the whole region.
The analysis of the sources of corporate finance shows that the role of the stock and
bond markets is currently very unimportant both compared to western countries and
in absolute terms. For Poland we investigate the corporate finance using micro data
for all companies listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange. We find that listed
companies differ significantly from not listed companies as the capital market plays
a more important role as a source of finance.
The CEE securities exchanges are under pressure for several reasons. The most
severe reason for the long term is the almost negligible usage of securities exchanges
as source of finance by private companies. We evaluate different possible forms of
(international) organization of CEE exchanges that could ensure future success of
the exchanges and improve the situation for private companies. In particular we
investigate a stand-alone solution, the creation of a pan CEE-exchange and different
forms of alliances with western exchanges. We find that a good strategy of CEE
exchanges would be to join alliances with Western European exchanges, and at best,
to join altogether the same western exchange. A stronger international integration of
the exchanges would also improve the integration of CEE companies into
international capital markets.
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Abstract
The picture of the securities exchanges and financial sectors in CEE countries is still
relatively unfavorable. The CEE securities exchanges – with the only exception of
the Warsaw Stock Exchange – are, in comparison with their western counterparts,
underdeveloped and less important for the domestic economies in general and for
corporate finance in particular. The CEE securities exchanges are under pressure for
several reasons and should change their form of (international) organization to
ensure future success. Stronger international integration of the exchanges could also
improve the integration of CEE companies into international capital markets.
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21 Introduction*
The securities exchanges of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are relatively small
emerging markets. The largest market among them – the Warsaw Stock Exchange –
is comparable in size and market turnover to the smallest Western European
exchange – the Vienna Stock Exchange. Most of the other CEE stock exchanges
such as Tallinn, Riga or Bratislava are still in their infancy and belong to the
smallest exchanges in the world. Taken as a whole, the CEE stock markets currently
account for no more than 0.2% of the world stock market capitalization.
The world-wide market downturn since 2000 has affected the CEE exchanges in
terms of market capitalization and trading volume as all other exchanges in the
world. The effects, however, are felt much more at the CEE exchanges and raises the
question whether these exchanges can be important for the CEE economies and
particularly for corporate finance in these countries.
In this study we concentrate on the possible future developments of CEE securities
exchanges and capital markets. Section 2 provides a detailed assessment of the
current status of CEE capital markets. We analyze the major characteristics of stock
and bond markets as well as the market for derivatives and investigate the role of
institutional investors which is a particularly important group of investors for the
development of financial markets. Section 3 evaluates the role of CEE capital
markets for corporate finance. We analyze the sources of finance of all CEE
companies. In a second step we investigate in detail the sources of finance of Polish
non-financial companies listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange using firm-level data.
As a result of this section we can evaluate the use of publicly issued instruments
(stocks and bonds) for corporate finance. Section 4 discusses future prospects of
CEE securities exchanges. As a result we make a proposal for an optimal form of
organization for CEE exchanges which could satisfy the needs of the different
interest groups involved. Section 5 concludes.
2 Current Status of CEE Securities Markets
To assess the current stage of development of CEE securities markets (stocks, bonds
and derivatives), we look at these markets from various perspectives and compare
them with selected Western European markets.
                                          
* We thank our discussant Eva Thiel, OECD, and other participants of the EIB conference „The
financial integration of an enlarged EU: Banking and capital markets“, held at the European
Investment Bank in Luxembourg at January 17, 2001, for helpful comments and suggestions.
All remaining errors and mistakes are ours.
32.1 Stock Markets
Table 1 gives an overview of important characteristics of CEE stock and bond
markets for the year 2000 and compares these markets to some Western European
exchanges. The table shows that the CEE stock exchanges are still relatively small.
In absolute size, only the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) is comparable to the
smallest Western European exchange – the Vienna Stock Exchange. All other CEE
stock exchanges do not only show low market capitalization, they are also relatively
unimportant for the economy. This can be seen from the relation of market
capitalization to GDP (column 3). Whereas for most of the western exchanges stock
market capitalization is well above 50%, the stock markets in Central and Eastern
Europe have a capitalization of only 17% or 18% (median) relative to GDP. This
means that only a small fraction of the total value of CEE companies is traded at the
stock exchanges. It is remarkable that the stock markets of Portugal and Greece have
developed very well in the last years. There is now a large gap between these two –
still developing – stock markets and the CEE stock markets.
Table 1: Major Characteristics of CEE Stock and Bond Markets, 2000
Stock Markets (Domestic Companies) Bond Markets
Market Capitalization Market Turnover2 Capitalization
Bn. US-$ Thereof:
Foreign
Investment1
In % of
GDP
Bn. US-$ In % of
Capitalization
In bn. US-$
(in % of GDP)
Czech Rep. 9.7 30.9% 19.2% 6.7 (TSV) 69.0% 5.2 (10.1%)
Estonia 1.8 27.8% 40.5% 0.31 (TSV) 17.2% 0.04 (1%)
Hungary 11.9 25.0% 26.1% 12.1 (TSV) 101.6% 9.2 (20.2%)
Latvia 0.56 7.1% 7.9% 0.27 (REV) 48.2% 0.46 (6.5%)
Lithuania 1.6 8.0% 14.2% 0.20 (TSV) 12.5% 0.39 (3.5%)
Poland 31.4 16.7% 18.9% 19.3 (TSV) 65.1% 17.9 (10.8%)
Slovak Rep. 0.44 31.9% (1999) 2.3% 0.54 (TSV) 122.7% 2.2 (7.0%)
Slovenia 3.1 4.8% 17.4% 0.92 (TSV) 29.7% 1.1 (6.2%)
Austria 29.9 49.3% 15.5% 9.6 (TSV) 32.1% 114.1 (59.1%)
Germany 1,270.2 30.0% 66.6% 2,119.8 (TSV) 166.9% 2,076.5 (1999)
(108.9%)
Greece 107.5 -- 89.6% 94.2 (TSV) 87.6% 79.5 (1999)
(66.3%)
Portugal 60.7 31.2% 56.7% 54.9 (TSV) 90.4% 49.0 (45.8%)
UK 2,612.2 37.8% 187.1% 4,558.7
(REV)
174.5% 1,423.7
(101.9%)
Notes: 1Foreign investment = international investment position, liabilities, equity securities
(International Financial Statistics, IMF, line 79 ldd) as % of stock market capitalization. 2TSV
counts only transactions which pass through the trading system or the trading´s floor, REV counts
all transactions under supervision by the market authority (off- and on-market). REV figures are
not directly comparable to TSV figures and are usually much larger by construction. Sources:
IMF, national central banks, International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) (2001), national
stock exchanges.
4Another important characteristic of stock markets is liquidity, which is often
measured as the ratio of market turnover to market capitalization (Table 1, column
5). This ratio tells how often the total value of stocks is turned over on average
during a year. A high ratio indicates that the market is relatively liquid. This is
particularly important for institutional investors with usually large order sizes. With
the exception of Austria the Western European stock markets have a turnover ratio
of 90% to 170%. Particularly the three Baltic exchanges show very low liquidity.
The other CEE stock markets have surprisingly high turnover ratios. Although the
economic relevance of these markets is rather limited, the degree of trading activity
seems to be comparable to western exchanges.
Examining the recent development of CEE stock markets provides another
perspective, but the conclusions are similar (Table 2). The number of stocks listed at
the Warsaw Stock Exchange has increased continuously since 1995. In contrast, in
the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic the number of listed firms
has stagnated or even decreased. The picture is similar regarding market
capitalization: Warsaw shows a continuously increasing size of the stock market
whereas the other three markets show stagnation or a considerable decrease.
Table 2: Development of Stock Markets 1995-2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Domestic Companies Listed:
Czech Republic 54 82 91 92 74 57
Hungary1 42 44 47 53 64 58
Poland1 65 83 143 198 221 225
Slovak Republic2 15 14 10 10 8 7
Market Capitalization (in % of GDP):
Czech Republic 20.0% 26.7% 24.4% 19.3% 22.6% 19.2%
Hungary 5.8% 12.2% 35.2% 29.4% 35.9% 26.1%
Poland 3.7% 6.2% 9.1% 13.0% 19.9% 18.9%
Slovak Republic 6.5% 6.4% 6.9% 3.2% 2.4% 2.3%
Notes: Statistics for market capitalization and trading volume exclude stocks traded in the
unregulated free market. The data include only domestic companies. 1 The data for Poland and
Hungary include also the regulated free market. 2 The data for the Slovak Republic include the
official market only. Source: International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV)(2001), national
stock exchanges.
The analysis of foreign demand for CEE assets gives an indication for the
attractiveness of CEE stock markets for foreign investors. Column 2 of Table 1
measures the value of stock market capitalization that is held by foreigners. These
figures are calculated using the international investment position in equity securities
which are documented in the International Financial Statistics (IMF, line 79 ldd).
5They measure the total value of foreign equity holdings at the end of the year
relative to stock market capitalization. As some equity holdings are part of foreign
direct investments, the foreign equity holdings may to some degree underestimate
the true holdings by foreigners. Four CEE countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary and the Slovak Republic – exhibit a foreign investment ratio that is
comparable to western countries. For Poland, the foreign stock holdings are
significantly lower but still much higher than in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.
Taking the foreign investment ratio as an indicator of the attractiveness of CEE
stock markets, we find that those CEE countries are attractive to foreigners for
which liquidity and market capitalization are comparably high. Figures on the inflow
of portfolio capital (for stocks and bonds) broadly confirm this result (Table 3).
Other reasons might be the institutional development of the securities markets and
the protection of property rights (see Garibaldi et al. (2001)).
Table 3: The Structure of Foreign Capital Inflows, Bn. US-$, Average of 1995-1999
Equities Bonds Portfolio Investment
(% of GDP)
Other
Investment
FDI
(% of GDP)
Czech Rep. 3.43 1.83 5.26 (1.9%) 13.58 13.1 (4.8%)
Estonia 0.57 0.22 0.79 (3.6%) 1.59 1.5 (6.8%)
Hungary 3.11 1.78 4.89 (2.1%) 1.22 12.9 (5.6%)
Latvia 0.04 0.21 0.25 (0.9%) 2.32 1.8 (6.4%)
Lithuania 0.07 0.69 0.76 (1.7%) 0.63 2.0 (4.5%)
Poland 3.31 1.69 5.00 (0.7%) 7.56 26.7 (3.8%)
Slovak Rep. 0.13 0.29 1.42 (1.4%) 5.10 1.7 (1.7%)
Slovenia 0.06 1.30 1.36 (1.4%) 1.97 1.2 (1.3%)
Notes: FDI = Foreign Direct Investment. Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Overall, the CEE stock markets are still underdeveloped and economically
unimportant compared to western stock markets. The markets in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland are the best developed markets among the CEE
countries. These three markets also have a market liquidity that is comparable to
Western European stock markets. The least developed CEE markets are those of the
Slovak Republic, Latvia and Lithuania. The recent decline in going public activity
darkens the perspectives for some CEE markets considerably. During 1999 and 2000
virtually no company went public in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and none
during 2000 in Hungary. Partially this might be due to the global downturn in stock
markets in 2000, but it also suggests a lack of interest in these markets.
62.2 Bond Markets
To examine the size of bond markets, we first look at total capitalization (last
column of Table 1). These figures should be interpreted with caution because a large
part – sometimes even the majority- of bonds are traded over the counter (OTC).
Typically, OTC traded bonds are included neither in capitalization nor in turnover
figures of bond markets. Therefore, Table 1 gives only an approximate picture. We
find that the CEE bond markets are – in absolute and relative size – small compared
to Western European bond markets. With the exception of the Slovak Republic, the
bond markets are even much smaller than the CEE stock markets, but this can
probably be explained by the large amount of OTC trade.
A different approach to examining the importance of CEE debt markets is the
analysis of all debt securities outstanding. This approach has the advantage that not
only publicly traded securities are examined and that it can distinguish between
domestic and international debt securities. According to the definition of the Bank
for International Settlements, domestic debt securities are bonds issued by local
issuers in local currency. International debt securities are (a) bonds issued by local
residents in the domestic or international market, denominated in foreign currency or
(b) bonds issued by international issuers (corporations or other institutions such as
the EBRD or the EIB) issuing in domestic markets, denominated in local or foreign
currency.
Table 4 shows the amount of outstanding domestic and international debt securities
as of December 2000. The Czech Republic has the (relative to GDP) largest
domestic debt market, measured in terms of total outstanding debt securities (46.1%
of GDP), Hungary ranks second (35.5%) and Poland third (20.3%). In absolute
terms, the Polish market for domestic debt securities is the largest with $33.9 billion
in 2000. This result suggests that the OTC market in Poland is indeed significant.
Compared to major western economies these markets are nevertheless small. We
also find that the markets for corporate non-financial bonds are insignificant with the
exception of the Czech market. However, corporate bond markets are also
underdeveloped in most of the western countries considered here, with the notable
exceptions of Portugal and the UK.
Regarding international debt securities, there is a significant market in Hungary and
the Slovak Republic, reaching 23.0% and 15.2% of GDP, respectively. But the
largest fraction of these international debt securities is issued by the public sector,
thus contributing little to corporate finance. Only in Poland international debt
securities are primarily issued by non-financial corporations.
7Table 4: Outstanding Debt Securities (in % of GDP) as of December 2000 by Type of
Security
Domestic Securities International Securities
Financial Corporate Total1 Financial Corporate Total1
Czech Republic 5.5% 5.3% 46.1% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hungary n.a. 1.5% 35.5% 0.4% 0.4% 23.0%
Poland n.a. 0.0% 20.3% 0.3% 2.3% 3.3%
Slovak Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0% 1.0% 15.2%
Germany 49.7% 1.3% 90.2% 39.9% 6.7% 47.7%
Spain 5.3% 4.8% 59.0% 14.8% 6.2% 27.2%
United Kingdom 20.1% 13.0% 63.3% 24.2% 14.8% 39.9%
Portugal 16.1% 9.6% 61.7% 15.8% 2.5% 32.1%
Austria 30.6% 1.7% 79.5% 28.5% 2.6% 49.4%
Notes: 1Total outstanding debt securities volume encompasses financial debt securities, corporate
debt securities as well as public debt securities. The last category is omitted from this table. n.a. =
not available. Sources: Bank for International Settlements (2001).
In sum, the CEE bond markets are generally still small compared to western
markets. In particular, the markets for corporate debt securities are underdeveloped.
Only in the Czech Republic, there is a significant and active primary market for
domestic corporate debt securities, and only in Poland, there is a significant primary
market for international corporate debt securities.
2.3 Derivatives Markets
Budapest and Warsaw are currently the only CEE exchanges offering derivatives for
trading. Prague obtained the permission to organize derivatives trading in August
2001. In this section we give a brief overview to the derivatives markets in Hungary
and Poland, regarding the type of securities, trading value and some remarks on the
market’s recent historical development.
The Budapest Stock Exchange has started trading futures contracts in April 1995:
index futures on the BUX, the main stock index in Budapest, interest futures with
terms between three months and three years, as well as currency futures on the US
Dollar, the Euro, the Japanese Yen, the British Pound and the Swiss Franc. Since
1998 also trading in derivatives on individual stocks is possible. In September 2001,
a total of 26 Hungarian stocks represented the potential underlying. The futures
contracts’ maximum maturity is 12 months, and for the BUX future it is 21 months.
The Warsaw Stock Exchange has started trading derivatives in January 1998: index
futures on the WIG20, the main stock index in Warsaw, interest futures as well as
currency futures on the US Dollar and the Euro. In August 2000, an index future on
the TechWIG, the stock market segment for young high-tech firms, has been added.
And since January 2001, futures on three individual stocks are available. The futures
8contracts maximum maturity is nine months, and for the individual stocks it is three
months.
Additionally, there is a standardized options market in Budapest. This market has
started in February 2000. During the year 2000, 132 options on three different stocks
and 40 options on the BUX have been traded. The turnover during 2000 was 9,747
contracts (1,231 for stocks and 8,516 for the index). In Warsaw, there is an OTC
market for 87 warrants on stocks, 26 on indices and four on bonds. However, trading
in the warrants is almost negligible.
Table 5 gives a brief summary of recent historical turnover volume for derivatives.
We find that both in Hungary and in Poland futures trading show a jump-start,
increasing exponentially after the introduction of derivatives trading. However,
futures trading on the BUX peaked in 1998 and since then declined steadily. In
contrast, futures trading on the WIG20 continues to increase in volume since its
introduction in 1998, reaching a value of 17.1 bn US$ over the period of January to
September 2001. This compares to 0.8 bn US$ for futures trading on the BUX.
Table 5: Turnover Value of Derivatives Trading (in Million US$), 1995-2001
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20011
Hungary:
BUX   4.2 322.0 5376.0 8313.2    4718.5 3126.1 822.1
Currencies 29.6 731.2 1803.3 4542.7        96.0   101.1    60.9
Stocks -- -- --   239.5      570.4 1563.5 823.9
Interest
Rates
47.0 197.7   401.3   591.5        51.9       6.6     0.0
Poland:
WIG20 -- -- --      0.2          1.5 9041.6 17143.7
Currencies -- -- -- --          0.1     129.51       233.68
Stocks -- -- -- -- --       0.0      157.8
Notes: 1 January-September 2001. Source: Budapest Stock Exchange (2001), Warsaw Stock
Exchange (2001).
Similarly, in Budapest trading value on interest derivative products sharply declined
after 1998. In 2001, trading in interest futures even came to a halt. One reason for
this decline is probably the improvement in macroeconomic conditions and
stabilizing interest rates. In contrast, the performance of futures contracts with a
single underlying stock looks encouraging as its turnover value continuously
increased and slightly exceeded turnover value of the BUX futures contracts in
2001. Regarding trading of currency futures, in Hungary as well as in Poland, their
volume is small compared to the futures on the indices or individual stocks.
Overall, the derivatives markets of CEE countries, as far as they exist, appear to be
quite active. Currently, in Poland the market for stock index futures is the most
active in terms of trading volume; the markets for futures on currencies and
9individual stocks are much smaller. In Hungary, most trading takes place in the
markets for index futures and futures on individual stocks. However, since 1998
total trading volume in the Budapest derivatives market has declined considerably.
This stands in sharp contrast to the successful start of the derivatives market in
Poland.
2.4 Institutional Investors
For western capital markets, assets under management of institutional investors
(such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies) have grown
tremendously in the past two decades (Blommestein, 1998). In addition, it is often
argued that institutional investors play an important role in improving corporate
governance (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). In the following we try to assess to
what extent institutional investors are already present in Central and Eastern Europe.
Table 6 shows the financial assets under institutional management, scaled by GDP.
Among the CEE countries, assets under institutional management are the most
significant in the Czech Republic with 20.3% of GDP in 1999, and this ratio does
not vary much over the past decade. One reason for this large institutional
involvement is the Czech voucher privatization scheme, which ultimately made the
(mostly publicly owned) investment funds the new owners of the privatized
companies. Institutional assets are smaller in Hungary (10.7% of GDP) and in
Poland (4.2%), but in both countries institutional ownership is steadily growing at
high speed. For example, in both countries it doubled in value during the four-year
period 1995-1998.
Table 6:  Financial Assets Under Institutional Management (in % of GDP), 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999P 2000P
Czech Rep. n.a.  22.8% 17.3% 17.8% 21.4% 19.0% 16.8% 20.3% n.a.
Hungary    2.5%    2.8%    3.9%    4.4%  6.1%    7.5%    8.9% 10.7%  12.8%
Poland    0.0%    0.6%    1.9%    1.5%  2.0%    2.6%    3.2%   4.2%    5.4%
Germany  34.0%  38.9% 41.3%  45.3% 50.6%  58.7%  66.1% 76.8%  79.7%
Spain  21.9%  29.3% 32.3%  33.4% 44.3%  56.0%  66.5% 65.4%  62.1%
United
Kingdom
131.3
%
163.0
%
143.8
%
164.0
%
173.4
%
195.5
%
203.6
%
226.7
%
n.a.
Portugal  18.3% 27.5% 29.8% 38.3% 43.2% 53.4% 48.7% 50.8% n.a.
Austria  24.1% 28.5% 30.4% 35.0% 40.3% 47.0% 54.6% 68.4% n.a.
Notes: P Data for 1999 and 2000 are provisional. No data are available for the Slovak Republic.
Sources: IMF (2001), OECD (2001).
Compared to major western economies, institutional investment in CEE economies
is still small. In Germany and the UK, institutional investors own financial assets
worth 76.8% and 226.7% of GDP in 1999, respectively. Smaller European countries
such as Austria, Portugal or Spain have experienced fast growing institutional
10
investment over the past few years. Hence, it is reasonable to assume a similar
development of institutional investment for the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. Factors driving this development are – compared to western standards – a
still young insurance sector, and in case of Hungary and Poland the reform of social
security. In Hungary a pension reform introduced private pension funds in 1997, and
in Poland in 1999. Recent statistics demonstrate that the Polish pension funds owned
assets of over 2.6 bn Zloty (0.4% of GDP) in the year 2000, and the Hungarian
pension funds about 13% of GDP (National Bank of Poland, 2001; National Bank of
Hungary, 2001).
An analysis of the composition of financial assets reveals that only a small fraction
is invested in stocks. Among the CEE countries it is the largest for Poland (15%)
and the Czech Republic (21%). The latter figure may be explained by the
ownership-taking role of investment funds in the Czech privatization process.
Institutional investors in Hungary appear to behave risk-averse, investing over three
quarters of financial assets in government bills or bonds, thereby financing the
government deficit. Thus, the Hungarian institutional investors play only an
insignificant role in corporate finance. According to the National Bank of Hungary
(2001), private and voluntary pension funds hold the largest fraction of risky assets
among the institutional investors, with about 14% in stocks. Compared to
institutional investors in the UK, where 65% are invested in stocks, institutional
investment in the stock market in the CEE economies is small. But as shown in
Table 6, there is a clear trend towards a larger institutional engagement, particularly
for those countries that implemented social securities reforms.
2.5 Key Regulatory Characteristics of CEE Stock Markets
Securities exchanges influence the functioning of the exchanges by setting listing
requirements and fees for admission, maintenance and trading. This section gives an
overview of the major qualitative and quantitative rules for the CEE exchanges and
those Western European exchanges where stocks or depositary receipts of CEE
companies are listed. Tables 7a – 7c show that the rules and fees are qualitatively
similar across the different exchanges, but there are also some large differences
concerning the details.
In general, the CEE securities exchanges have much higher minimum standards for
market capitalization, both in the official and in the regulated markets than Frankfurt
or London. The highest minimum levels can be found at the Newex (New Europe
Exchange) which aimed at becoming a central exchange for CEE stocks. In addition
to criteria for the free float, which are almost the same for all exchanges compared,
most of the CEE exchanges have requirements concerning the number of
shareholders to guarantee a minimum of liquidity. The Newex established so-called
11
liquidity providers that have to set bid and ask quotes to provide a basis for active
trading.
Companies listed in the official market are required to publish their financial
information according to the International Accounting Standards (IAS). Therefore
this information is published in an internationally comparable way. In addition, most
exchanges (except Bratislava) require quarterly company reports. But only in
Bratislava, Warsaw and at the Newex the financial information have to be published
in English. These relatively high standards impose additional costs on the listed
companies. But as the exchanges and companies in Central and Eastern Europe have
to build up confidence to attract domestic and foreign investors these rules probably
have a positive impact because they lower the information costs of investors.
At the regulated markets (also called parallel or secondary markets) the listing
requirements are a compromise between the strictly regulated official markets and
the almost fully unregulated free markets. Nevertheless, Bratislava and Prague stock
exchanges as well as the Newex require IAS for the financial statements of the
companies. Therefore at these three exchanges international investors also have
relatively low information costs concerning accounting figures.
The fixed and variable fees for admission and maintenance, and the fee structures
are very different across exchanges. But the fees do not seem to be excessive and
therefore should not be an obstacle for going public. The fees at the CEE exchanges
are also comparable to those for listing depositary receipts at the London Stock
Exchange.
At most CEE exchanges only a minority of the companies are listed at the official
markets. Only at the Warsaw Stock Exchange, the number of listings at the official
market (in 2000: 131 companies = 62,1% of all listings) is significantly higher than
at the other two market segments. At most of the other CEE exchanges listings at the
unregulated free markets dominate, e.g. in the Czech Republic at the end of 2000
55% of all listings have been at the free market, in Latvia 65.1%, in the Slovak
Republic 95.6% and in Slovenia 74%. With the exception of Warsaw these listings
impose no costs on the companies. But due to the lack of regulation these firms are
hardly of any interest to foreign and domestic investors. International investors
therefore have to concentrate on the few stocks of the official markets and partly the
stocks of the regulated market. The concentration of listings in the free market
segments are probably due to overly strict listing requirements. Also the fee
structures could give some incentive for a listing in the free market, as there are –
with the exception of Warsaw - no fees in the free market segment.
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In summary, the regulatory rules and the fee structures of the CEE stock exchanges
are rather different. Even the classification of the different market segment is not
fully comparable across exchanges. A harmonization of the regulatory rules could
significantly reduce the information costs of investors. The listing requirements of
the official market segments are relatively high compared to Western European
exchanges. These strict requirements may be one reason for the relatively small
number of listings in this segment. As there is also a high concentration of listings in
the unregulated free market segments, most of the CEE stock markets have the
disadvantage of inducing high information costs to investors. Thus, these exchanges
are relatively unattractive for institutional investors, particularly from abroad. The
only exception seems to be the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
3 The Role of Capital Markets for Corporate Finance
In this section, we try to evaluate to what extent firms from Central and Eastern
Europe use capital markets for financing corporate investment. First we give an
overview to the sources of corporate finance using information on bank credit as
well as bond and share issues. The major advantage of this top-down approach is
that it uses data aggregated on the country level and therefore covers all domestic
firms. It also allows to compare the sources of finance between Eastern and Western
European countries. In a second step, we make use of detailed firm-level data. In a
case-study framework we evaluate the sources of finance for all non-financial
corporations listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, the largest CEE stock market.
3.1 Sources of Finance
To obtain a comprehensive picture of the funding sources for corporate investment
in the CEE economies, we collect information from a variety of data sources. The
aim is to investigate to what extent investment in non-financial enterprises is funded
by credit, bond issues and stock issues. We distinguish between three kinds of credit
(credit by resident banks, credit by non-resident banks and inter-company loans),
two kinds of bonds (domestic bonds and international bonds)1 and share issues.2
Credit by resident banks is defined as the change in the credit stock provided by the
resident banking system to non-financial enterprises. Credit by non-resident banks is
defined as the change in the loans taken abroad by “other sectors”, a sub-item of the
                                          
1 Domestic debt securities are bonds issued by local issuers in local currency. International debt
securities are (a) bonds issued by local residents in the domestic or international market,
denominated in foreign currency or (b) bonds issued by international issuers (corporates or
other institutions such as the EBRD or the EIB) issuing in domestic markets, denominated in
local or foreign currency. See Bank for International Settlements (2001).
2 Below we also distinguish between capital raised through already listed firms (seasoned public
offerings) and capital raised by newly listed firms (initial public offerings).
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countries’ international liabilities.3 Intercompany loans are loans of the parent
company to a (non-financial) subsidiary. Complying to the methodology of the IMF,
these loans are part of foreign direct investment (FDI). Funds from securitized debt
can be originated from the issue of domestic bonds, which are mostly local-currency
denominated, and from the issue of international bonds, which are mostly foreign-
currency denominated. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides
information on the net issue value of both types of securities, separately for the
corporate, financial and public sector. Since we are interested in the funding sources
of the non-financial corporate sector, we focus on corporate sector debt securities.
Finally, funds raised by share issues, both from initial and secondary public
offerings, are reported by the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV).
Table 8 reports the ratio of funds obtained from each of these sources to gross fixed
capital formation, which is calculated as the average for the years 1999 and 2000 to
smooth short-run fluctuations.
For the CEE economies, we find that the sum of capital raised by credits from
resident and non-resident banks, intercompany loans as well as domestic and
international debt securities varies greatly by country. It is the largest for Hungary
with 41.9% of gross fixed capital formation, the second largest for Poland with
23.6% and much smaller for the Czech Republic (10.3%) and the Slovak Republic
(4.0%). These results suggest that Hungarian non-financial firms fund a
comparatively large fraction of corporate fixed investment by raising capital
externally. In contrast, firms from former Czechoslovakia obviously have severe
difficulties in raising funds externally and are likely to be constrained to using
internally generated funds (e.g. retained earnings) for financing investment. The
comparison with Germany, Spain and Portugal shows that Hungary has already
reached a western level of external funding.
Table 8 also provides evidence on the relative weight of each of the funding sources.
For Hungary and Poland, credits by resident banks are the most important source of
funding, credit by non-resident banks the second most important. In both countries,
more than three quarters of all external funds are raised in the form of bank credit.
For Portugal, this dominance of funding by credit is similar, and to a lesser extent
also for Spain. For the Czech Republic, financing by credit from domestic banks is
even negative during the years 1999-2000. This signals severe credit constraints.
High real interest rates – indicating the cost of capital – cannot be blamed for the
lack of borrowing since real lending rates are only 100-150 basis points above the
EU level (Deutsche Bank Research, 2001). Rather, this shortfall appears to be a
result of excessive lending in early years of transition, followed by a credit crunch
and extreme risk aversion after the collapse of several financial institutions.
                                          
3 Using credits taken by „other sectors“ as a proxy for borrowing by non-financial enterprises
assumes that credits taken abroad by domestic households is negligible.
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Table 8: Sources of Funding (in % of Gross Fixed Capital Formation),
Average for 1999-2000
(1)
Credits
from
Resident
Banks
(2)
Credits
from Non-
Resident
Banks
(3)
Intercom-
pany
Loans
(4)
Domestic
Debt
Securities
(5)
International
Debt
Securities
(6)
Sum of
(1)-(5)
(7)
IPO/SPO
Czech
Republic
      -2.6%    4.1% 4.4% 4.4% n.a. 10.3% 1.1%
Hungary       18.6% 15.4% 5.6% 1.4% 0.9% 41.9% 7.6%
Poland      11.1%       6.7% 3.6% 0.0% 2.2% 23.6% 1.3%
Slovak
Republic
      0.7%     -2.4% 3.0% n.a. 2.6%     4.0% 0.0%
Germany       6.6%        1.8% 14.3% 2.3%     11.4% 36.4%    5.2%
Spain    44.6%     11.7% 2.6% 4.5%     10.3% 73.6%  67.8%
Portugal   36.7%    -0.9% 3.4% 2.6%      4.4% 46.2%  36.3%
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2001), national central banks, IMF (2001).
Czech firms are partially able to circumvent these credit constraints by accessing the
market for debt securities. We find that Czech firms raise a larger amount of capital
(relative to gross fixed capital formation) by issuing debt securities than firms from
Hungary or Poland. This finding is consistent with the result from Section 2.2,
which shows that the Czech corporate bond market is the most developed among the
CEE economies in terms of size and trading. Comparing the Czech bond market
with western markets, we find that only the Spanish market for corporate debt
securities is similarly large. In contrast, firms from Germany and Spain are able to
raise a much larger amount of capital by issuing international debt securities than
firms from the CEE countries. One reason for this finding could be that for CEE
firms the costs of issuing on foreign bond markets are too high compared to the
domestic market (e.g. due to larger risk premia or higher transaction costs); another
reason could be that issuing in foreign currency is regarded as too risky due to
increasing exchange rate volatility.
Additionally, the last column of Table 8 presents the amount of capital raised by
newly or already listed companies via initial or secondary public offerings, again
relative to gross fixed capital formation. We find that the largest amount of capital
has been raised at the Budapest Stock Exchange, whereas raising funds via public
stock offerings has been rather limited in the other three CEE countries. Note that
extremely large amounts of capital are raised during 1999-2000 in Portugal and
Spain. Partially this reflects a catch-up process for the respective stock markets.
Taking Germany as the benchmark for the CEE countries, public stock issues do not
contribute significantly to corporate finance in Poland, the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic.
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In sum, compared to western countries only Hungarian firms finance a similarly
large fraction of gross fixed capital formation externally (about 50%), i.e. without
relying on internally generated funds such as retained earnings.4 This fraction is
much lower for Poland (25%), the Czech Republic (11%) and the Slovak Republic
(4%). Whereas these ratios are only a very rough approximation for the sources of
finance since they are based on highly aggregated data for each economy, the
observed significant difference between these four CEE countries should be reliable.
Among external funds, for Hungary and Poland the dominant sources of funding are
domestic as well as foreign credits. In contrast, during the period of 1999-2000
Czech and Slovak firms appear to have had major difficulties in financing
investment by (particularly domestic) credit. Overall, usage of capital market
funding is very limited: Financing by stock issues is the highest in Hungary (7.6% of
gross fixed capital formation), and financing by domestic bond issues is the highest
in the Czech Republic (4.4%).
3.2 Case Study: Sources of Finance in Poland
To complement our top-down approach from Section 3.1, we now examine the
sources of corporate finance in a bottom-up type manner. Specifically, we examine
all corporations listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange over the period 1994-2000.
The main reason for selecting Poland is that the Polish stock market is the largest
and the best developed among the CEE markets. In addition, disclosure
requirements are very strict, requiring firms to submit quarterly information to
shareholders according to the International Accounting Standards (IAS). We
investigate the financial statements for all non-financial corporations over the period
1994-2000 to obtain a detailed picture of the sources of finance available for
investment.
Table 9 distinguishes between three sources of funding: internal funds (measured as
net profit plus interest payments, taxes and depreciation), asset divestiture (measured
as inflows from investment activity, especially from the sale of fixed and intangible
assets and from the sale of marketable securities) and external funds (measured as
inflows from financial activity, especially loans taken and issues of bonds and own
shares). During the period 1998-2000, external funds play the dominant role among
the three sources of gross finance. On average, for small and large firms more than
50% of gross funds are external funds. Internal funding contributes much less to
total funding, with on average 14.0% for small firms and 24.7% for large firms. Not
negligible are also the funds obtained from asset divestitures. A comparison with the
period 1994 -1997 shows that in this period internal funding constituted the main
source of funding, with 57.0% for small firms and 42.6% for large firms. Hence,
                                          
4 As a rough approximation, the fraction of internal finance can be calculated as 100% less the
fraction observed for all external sources of finance including IPO/SPO.
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funding by internally generated funds declined sharply over the recent five years. In
contrast, funding by asset divestitures became significantly more important. These
findings are consistent with the notion that increasing product market competition
eroded profit margins, thereby reducing the ability for internal funding. At the same
time, Polish firms appear to have adapted their corporate structures by spinning off
some assets or to have reduced free cash flow, as reflected in the increasing role of
funds generated from asset sales. Overall, in recent years the largest volume of funds
is, on average, not any longer generated internally but raised externally.
Table 9: Gross Sources of Funding of all Polish companies (non-financial) listed at the
Warsaw Stock Exchange, 1994-2000
1994-1997 1998-2000
Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms
Internal Funds    57.0% 42.6% 14.0% 24.7%
Asset Divestiture       9.3% 17.5% 30.3% 24.3%
External Funds      3.7% 39.9% 55.7% 51.1%
Total    100.% 100.% 100.%  100.%
Number of obs.   380 382 344 345
Notes: All reported statistics are calculated at the mean. Gross sources of funding are measured as
follows: internal funds (net profit + interest payments + taxes + depreciation), asset divestiture
(inflows from investment activity, especially sale of fixed and intangible assets and sale of
marketable securities) and external funds (inflows from financial activity, especially loans taken
and issues of bonds and own shares). Statistics are calculated as the average for each of the four
subsamples. Large/small firms are firms with total assets above/below the year-specific sample
median. Source: Notoria Serwis S.A.
Table 10 investigates the inflows from financial activity more closely, essentially by
splitting them into the contribution by loans taken, bonds and shares issued, and
other sources. We find that the largest fraction of externally raised funds consists of
new loans, with about 70% during the years 1998-2000. The largest part of these
loans are short-term (i.e. with maturity less than one year). Funding by bond issues
is much smaller. This difference in the type of debt financing indicates that loans are
still more popular and probably easier accessible than bond issues. At the Warsaw
Stock Exchange, only one corporate bond is traded since April 2000. This suggests
that Polish stock corporations are able to issue international bonds which are not
traded on the WSE. But clearly, the probability to make use of bond finance is
positively related to firm size. Concerning the role of equity finance, share issues
contribute to 18.4% for small firms and 9.4% for large firms. Hence, stock issues
appear to be more relevant for smaller firms. This suggests that stock issues are used
as a source of finance typically by smaller and probably younger firms, for example
in the course of an initial public offering. Larger and probably older firms make less
use of public stock offerings, although the fraction of 9.4% is still significant.
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Table 10: Composition of Gross External Funding of all Polish companies (non-financial)
listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 1994-2000
1994-1997 1998-2000
Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms
Loans Taken 56.3% 63.4% 69.8% 71.5%
thereof Short-term 42.6% 45.0% 56.1% 54.7%
Bonds Issued   3.2%   8.1%  5.0% 13.6%
thereof Short-term   2.1%   5.9%   4.5% 10.7%
Shares Issued 29.1% 22.1% 18.4%   9.4%
Other 11.4%  6.4%  6.7%    5.4%
Total 100.% 100.% 100.%  100.%
Number of obs. 380 382 344 345
Notes: Composition of gross external funding is measured as follows: loans taken (long- and short-
term loans taken), bonds issues (long- and short-term bonds issued), shares issued (inflows from
issue of own shares). ‘Short-term’ means maturity is less than one year. Statistics are calculated as
the mean for each of the four subsamples (median reported in parentheses). Large/small firms are
firms with total assets above/below the year-specific sample median. Source: Notoria Serwis S.A.,
own calculationsEinführung
A comparison with the respective figures for 1994-1997 reveals that loan and bond
financing has become more common, and equity financing less common. One
reason for the decline in equity financing by stock issues is certainly the decline in
going public activity, which in turn reflects the slowdown in privatization activity.
The increase in bond financing versus loan financing indicates that Polish stock
corporations are not restricted to loan finance. To the contrary, the use of debt
securities has increased by more than 50% when comparing the fractions reported in
Table 10 for the periods of 1994-1997 and 1998-2000.
Overall, this case study illustrates the funding sources for corporate investment
using micro data for all non-financial corporations listed at the Warsaw Stock
Exchange. We are able to confirm the dominance of loan finance, as documented in
Section 3.1. Hence, the dominance of loan funding appears to be similar for listed
and non-listed Polish firms. But the results of this section indicate that internal
funding plays a much smaller role for listed firms than for all other firms in the
economy. Similarly, for listed firms we are not able to confirm that finance by the
issue of debt or equity securities plays an almost insignificant role, as documented in
Section 3.1 for the entire Polish economy. For large listed firms, these two sources
of funding contribute to about a quarter of all externally raised funds, which in turn
make up for about 50% of gross funding. Therefore, listed Polish corporations
appear to differ substantially in terms of sources of finance from other Polish firms
because the capital market plays an important role in their financing patterns.
Nevertheless, loan finance is still the dominant source of funding also for listed
firms. This stands in contrast to the situation of non-listed firms, which
predominantly rely on internally generated funds.
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4 Future Prospects for CEE Securities Exchanges
In this section we first describe and evaluate the current form of international
organization of CEE securities exchanges, and second, we analyze in detail the
options for future changes and give a recommendation for an optimal form of
international organization.
4.1 The Current Organization of CEE Securities Exchanges and
Options for the Future
The results of the last two chapters have shown a relatively unfavorable picture for
the CEE stock and bond markets. The CEE securities markets are under pressure for
several reasons. First, the supply of new assets by domestic companies is very small
as can be seen, for example, by the decomposition of sources of funding of CEE
companies shown in Table 8 (column 7). IPO and SPO are almost negligible for
most CEE countries, except perhaps Hungary. This restricts the future potential for
growth in market capitalization and turnover of the stock exchanges. Second, the
current world-wide downturn in stock prices and turnover could damage the CEE
exchanges severely as the very low market size and liquidity are further reduced to a
level where the existence of some CEE exchanges is under question.
The CEE securities exchanges have developed different strategies to improve their
situation. Most of these strategies focus on alliances with western exchanges. The
three Baltic exchanges Tallinn, Riga and Lithuania have created the so-called Baltic
list which aims at harmonizing the trade in 15 blue chip stocks of that area. The
Baltic exchanges also intend to soon join the Nordic Stock Exchange (Norex) which
is an alliance of the four Northern European exchanges in Copenhagen, Oslo,
Stockholm and Iceland.5 On the other side, the Helsinki Exchange (HEX) holds 50%
of the equity of the Tallinn Exchange. The HEX is also linked to the German Stock
Exchange. This relatively complex picture of international connections of the three
Baltic exchanges shows that these exchanges see the solution to their problems in
joining stronger partners.
This is also the strategy of the Warsaw Stock Exchange which has signed a letter of
intent with the London Stock Exchange in July 1999 to strengthen future
cooperation. The Warsaw Stock Exchange, however, has also contacts with
Euronext. The probability of joining Euronext has increased with the introduction of
the WARSET trading system which was developed by the SBF-Paris Bourse for the
Warsaw exchange. The Prague Stock Exchange has signed a Memorandum on
Mutual Cooperation with the London Stock Exchange in mid-2000. The other CEE
                                          
5 The negotiations between the Norex and the three Baltic exchanges have come to a
(temporary?) halt since May 2001.
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exchanges - Budapest, Ljubljana and Bratislava – still try to continue business on
their own.
The landscape of international security exchanges currently undergoes rapid
changes. Most experts expect and recommend a consolidation that should further
decrease the operating and trading costs; see Lee (2002) and McAndrews and
Stefanadis (2002). Schmiedel (2001) finds that European exchanges are operating at
a cost level that is 20 – 25% above an efficient benchmark. Consolidation is not
restricted to exchanges but includes also important services such as cross-border
clearing and settlement; see Giovannini Group (2001). Another driving force of
stock exchange consolidation is the integration process in the European Union; see
the proposals of the Committee of Wise Men (2001). The CEE exchanges are no
active players in this consolidation game. Rather, they will have to find an optimal
solution under the restriction of the future world-wide changes.
According to Lee (2002) the international exchanges face the following trilemma: 1.
try to do business successfully on their own, 2. build a virtual exchange by
establishing remote linkages among some exchanges and 3. create a larger typically
regional exchange by merging with other exchanges. Lee is relatively skeptical on
the success of the second option as he believes that changes in the economic
environment will often lead to incentives to leave the alliance. Instead, he expects a
merger to be a more stable scenario.
As Malkamäki (2000) shows, there are significant economies of scale only
concerning the processing of trades. In other business units he finds economies of
scale only for “very large exchanges”. Hence, the CEE exchanges should try to cut
costs by creating a common trading platform with other exchanges.
Claessens et al. (2202) investigate the reasons for the migration of companies in
emerging economies to international financial centers. Exchanges in emerging
economies face the problem that when the financial sector of the economy is
successfully developed the companies have increased opportunities to access
international exchanges. Particularly the largest companies will find it attractive to
go abroad. This causes a reduction of liquidity for the domestic stock exchanges and
reduces the chances of these exchange to develop successfully. As the authors do not
find a comparative advantage of stock exchanges in emerging economies “in
offering capital raising, listing and trading services”, they recommend not to develop
fully-fledged stock markets in emerging economies. Instead they propose to improve
the financial infrastructure such as shareholder rights and the legal system. As a
consequence, domestic companies should have easier access to foreign exchanges
and more international capital could be attracted. In addition, the authors
recommend to link regional stock markets with each other and with larger foreign
exchanges. Then domestic investors should have cheaper and easier access to
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foreign assets. As smaller companies in emerging economies are often not able to
raise capital abroad, the credit market and the market for venture capital should also
be developed.
Pagano et al. (2001a, 2001b) analyze the reasons for companies to list abroad. They
find some reasons that significantly influence the success of international stock
exchanges to attract foreign companies: liquid exchanges with low trading costs,
high accounting standards and good shareholder protection. Exchanges with these
characteristics should be particularly attractive for investors and thus lead to low
costs of funding equity for the companies. Nevertheless, accounting standards
should not be too stringent as they induce extra costs to the listed companies. This
last finding of Pagano et al. can be an explanation for the fact that only a small
fraction of CEE companies is listed in the top trading segment whereas most
companies prefer to be traded in the free market.
From the point of view of the costs of financial services for domestic companies and
investors, McAndrews and Stefanadis (2002) propose an increase in competition
among international stock exchanges. According to the authors the governments
should create regulatory standards and remove obstacles to full competition in this
field. As a consequence the costs of corporate and private finance should
significantly decrease.
To sum up, the main results of the aforementioned studies are: first, the financial
sector infrastructure and particularly the legal system in CEE countries should have
a high international standard to attract foreign capital and to enable domestic
companies to have access to foreign financial sectors, second, the CEE stock
exchanges should be linked with each other and with larger international exchanges,
third, these linkages or alliances will be particularly cost-saving when they
concentrate on a common trading platform and common trading standards, and
fourth, a higher degree of domestic and international competition within the
financial sector can help to reduce the financing costs of domestic companies and
investors.
4.2 An optimal Solution for the Organization of CEE Securities
Exchanges
The stock exchanges of Central and Eastern Europe have already begun to analyze
new forms of organization which could improve their business in the future. As
described in section 4.1 some exchanges are in the process to find an alliance with a
Western European stock exchange, the Baltic exchanges have built a regional
network and a few exchanges are still trying to develop their own business alone.
Besides these three forms of organization there are – at least – two other possible
solutions: the CEE exchanges could join an alliance with a western exchange
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altogether instead of single alliances and they could create a pan-CEE stock
exchange. The aim of the following reasoning is to evaluate the different forms of
organization for the CEE exchanges and to find a solution that could be optimal for
investors, issuers and the exchanges themselves.
In the literature on the future global organization of securities exchanges (see e.g.
Accenture (2001), Fischer and Kunz (2001), OECD (2001a)) an optimal solution is
discussed that has the following characteristics: the exchange is organized as
network, trade is fully centralized (common trading platform) and the local
exchanges have remote membership to the trading platform and have the major task
to offer service to the users of the exchange. Such a concept creates a market with
relative high liquidity and harmonized institutional arrangements which should
result in relatively low overall costs for investors. This concept can serve as a
benchmark for the evaluation of the future options of CEE exchanges.
Option 1: Stand-alone solution
The stock exchanges of Budapest, Ljubljana and Bratislava are not looking for an
alliance with a western exchange and try to do business on their own. But this is
probably no viable solution for the long run. In a stand-alone solution the exchange
has to bear the full overhead costs. The costs of e.g. a new trading system cannot be
shared with other exchanges. Another important problem concerns the
standardization of the rules of the exchange (e.g. the listing requirements, trading
rules). If the rules are not harmonized with the rules of a larger western exchange
foreign investors may find it too costly to accommodate to the rules of a relatively
small stock exchange. As a consequence, larger companies will manage to cross-list
at a foreign exchange and to use the foreign exchange for raising new capital. This
will make it hard to increase market capitalization and liquidity. Therefore the above
mentioned three CEE exchanges will be forced to choose a different solution in the
long run.
Option 2: Fully fledged CEE exchange
The CEE exchanges could try to merge and create a pan-CEE exchange. Compared
to option 1 this has the advantage of harmonized rules within the group of CEE
exchanges and a higher liquidity. But this exchange has also major shortcomings:
negotiations among up to eight CEE exchanges should be very difficult as all have
different interests, and the new exchange has to build up an own infrastructure
which might be very costly. To our knowledge, the CEE exchanges have actually no
interest to merge with each other.
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Option 3: Single alliances with western exchanges
The exchanges in Prague and Warsaw and the three Baltic exchanges try to join an
alliance with a western exchange. An alliance or a merger with a larger Western
European exchange has several advantages which are mainly the disadvantages of a
stand-alone strategy: an alliance can help to share overhead costs, the rules of the
CEE exchange are harmonized with the rules of the western partner exchange and
third, CEE companies are integrated in a large and liquid capital market.
But there are also some disadvantages when each of the CEE stock exchanges
decide to choose a different partner exchange. For the CEE exchange one of the
most severe problems is the small capitalization compared to the western partner
exchange. For example, the market capitalization of the Warsaw Stock Exchange at
the end of 2000 was only 1.4% of the capitalization of Euronext. Thus, stocks of
Polish companies are of little importance for the business strategy and economic
performance of Euronext. Polish stocks would also be hardly visible within the stock
list of the alliance. Hence companies from CEE countries will still be interested in
cross-listings at other exchanges. And investors particularly interested in CEE stocks
still have the problem that CEE stocks are listed at many exchanges with different
rules and clearing and settlement systems.
Option 4: All CEE stock exchanges choose an alliance with the same western
exchange
For investors, companies from CEE countries and the CEE stock exchanges it might
therefore be a superior solution that all or most of the CEE exchanges decide to join
an alliance with the same western exchange. In this case the disadvantages of single
alliances could be avoided. First, the CEE exchanges altogether are more important
in terms of market capitalization. Compared to Euronext their share in the common
market capitalization of about 2.6% would still be relatively small. But joining the
Norex this share would be approximately 10%. At least in this latter case the CEE
exchanges together should have some influence on the business strategy of the
alliance. For the investors the major advantage of this solution would be that all
CEE stocks could be traded at the same exchange and as a consequence the cost of
information and accommodation with institutional arrangements would be lowest.
Issuers, on the other hand, would not have significant incentives to cross-list outside
the alliance. Therefore, this solution could guarantee the highest market liquidity. In
addition, the CEE stocks could benefit from a high visibility to investors.
Nevertheless, although this solution has many advantages it is not the most probable
one. The CEE stock exchanges do not seem to prefer this model but instead try to
find an optimal partner exchange in Western Europe on their own. The reason might
be an overweight of the interests of the management of the exchanges compared to
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the interests of their clients. In the short term the management could benefit from
becoming the only CEE partner of a western exchange because in this case the
individual importance is not divided among several CEE exchanges. Another reason
is that negotiations among up to eight CEE exchange could easily become too
complicate compared to bilateral negotiations between one western and one CEE
exchange.
To sum up, for CEE exchanges an alliance or a merger with a western exchange is
preferable to the other options (stand-alone solution, pan-CEE exchange). This
should also be the best form of organization for the users of the exchanges: CEE
companies are integrated in a large and liquid capital market and the investors
benefit from the harmonization of regulatory rules and institutional arrangements
and relatively low overall transaction costs. Most probable is that CEE exchanges
enter single alliances with western exchanges.
5 Conclusion
The picture of the securities exchanges and financial sectors in CEE countries is still
relatively dark. The stock markets exhibit a low market capitalization – both in
absolute terms and relative to GDP – and a low level of liquidity compared to
Western European exchanges. The best developed stock exchanges are those of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Among this group the Polish stock exchange
clearly merits a top ranking. The Warsaw Stock Exchange has the highest
capitalization, the largest official market segment which is particularly interesting
for foreign and institutional investors, and a liquid index future on the blue chip
index WIG20 which allows investors to efficiently hedge stock market risk.
Regarding the sources of corporate finance, CEE firms finance the largest fraction of
investment internally. Compared to western countries, only Hungarian firms finance
a similarly large fraction of gross fixed capital formation externally (about 50%), i.e.
without relying on internally generated funds such as retained earnings. This fraction
is much lower for Poland (25%), the Czech Republic (11%) and the Slovak Republic
(4%). Closer analysis of the sources of external finance reveals that the largest part
is obtained by taking new credits, and a much smaller part by issuing equity or debt
securities. Particularly in Hungary and Poland, new credits contribute significantly
to financing investment, and particularly in the Czech Republic the issue of
domestic debt securities is relevant for corporate finance.
Overall, this dominance of credit finance is confirmed in a case study of all non-
financial corporations listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange. We find that in recent
years Polish listed firms predominantly rely on credit finance. Compared to earlier
years of transition, internal funding has declined significantly. Similarly, finance by
equity issues has declined over the period 1994-2000 but still contributes strongly to
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corporate finance. This suggests that the Polish privatization scheme conducted by
large-scale sales to strategic investors connected with a going public has benefited
the Polish stock market, and the Polish stock market appears to be viable even in
times of a slowdown in privatization activity. This finding contrasts with the
evidence for the other CEE countries, which recently show a much larger decline in
going public activity than Poland.
The CEE stock exchanges have an organization comparable to Western European
exchanges. The official markets and partly also the regulated markets have relatively
strict listing requirements. Therefore, foreign investors have relatively low
information costs at the official market segment. But with the exception of the
Warsaw Stock Exchange only a minority of companies is listed at the official
market. Usually the unregulated free market has the highest number of listings. This
may be due to overly strict listing requirements and high publication standards in the
official market segment and partly also the regulated market. As a consequence,
foreign investors interested in CEE stocks are mostly restricted to the few stocks
listed at the official market segments.
The different regulatory rules and institutional arrangements of the CEE exchanges
induce relatively high information costs to investors and together with low liquidity
the overall transaction costs are relatively high. This reduces the interest of foreign
investors in CEE stocks. The CEE exchanges are also under pressure because
domestic companies do hardly use the exchanges to for external funding. The
securities exchanges try to escape these problems by joining stronger partners in
Western European countries. According to our analysis this is probably the best
what the CEE exchanges can do because then the regulatory and institutional rules
are the same as in western partner exchanges, the listed companies are fully
integrated in a large capital market and for investors the transaction costs are
relatively low. Probably most of the CEE exchanges will join an alliance with a
western exchange in the next years.
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